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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Joy Guion, an employee at HSM Solutions, a 
diversified manufacturing company, traveled to Clinica Biblica, a 
hospital in San Jose, Costa Rica for gastric sleeve surgery.1  The 
surgery, which would have cost approximately $30,000 in the 
United States, cost only $17,386 in Costa Rica.2  This included the 
cost of in-patient stay in a “pristine room” in a “state-of-the-art 
hospital.”3  Even with insurance, Guion would have paid $3,000 out 
of pocket in the United States.4  However, in Costa Rica, Guion pays 
nothing; the company foots the bill not only for the medical 
expense, but transportation and lodging as well.5  Guion is part of 
an ever-increasing wave of Americans who are electing to receive 
medical care internationally.6  Although the reasons many 
Americans, including Guion, travel abroad for medical care vary, the 
most powerful incentive, by far, is cost.7 
U.S. patients continue to spend a disproportionately large 
percentage of their wealth on health care compared to those of other 
 
 1  Nightline: US Companies Look to ‘Medical Tourism’ to Cut Costs (ABC television 
broadcast Oct. 10, 2013), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/us-
companies-medical-tourism-cut-costs-20427966; Ask a Patient: Americans Turn to 
Medical Tourism for Healthcare Relief, MED. TOURISM MAG. (Sept. 12, 2014), available at  
http://www.medicaltourismmag.com/blog/2014/09/ask-patient-americans-turn-
medical-tourism-relief-bleeding-healthcare-system/. 
 2  Medical Tourism Surgeries Pay Off Overseas for U.S. Employers, MED. TOURISM MAG. 
(Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.medicaltourismmag.com/news/2013/10/ 
medical-tourism-surgeries-pay-off-overseas-for-u-s-employers/. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id.  
 6  Linda F. Powers, Leveraging Medical Tourism, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 1, 2006, at 79, 
available at http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/23768/title/ 
Leveraging-Medical-Tourism/.  In 2004, Powers estimated that Thailand alone received 
over one million medical tourists from Australia, Europe, and the United States.  Id.  
Powers went on to predict that in the “next five to seven years” medical tourism would 
increase six-fold to approximately six million by 2012.  Id.  See also Nathan Cortez, 
Cross Border Health Care and the Hydraulics of Health Reform, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
HEALTH CARE 65, 70 (I. Glenn Cohen, ed., 2013) (“[S]urvey results lend some credibility 
to the anecdotal evidence that U.S. patients increasingly travel for health care.”).  But 
see Reenita Das, Medical Tourism Gets a Facelift. . .and Perhaps a Pacemaker, FORBES (Aug. 
19, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reenitadas/ 2014/08/19/medical-
tourism-gets-a-facelift-and-perhaps-a-pacemaker/ (stating that in 2014 only 1.25 
million Americans traveled overseas for medical care).  While it is clear that medical 
tourism is increasing, it remains unclear the extent to which U.S. patients are actually 
going overseas. 
 7  Heather T. Williams, Fighting Fire With Fire: Reforming the Health Care System 
Through a Market-Based Approach to Medical Tourism, 89 N.C. L. REV. 607, 613 (2011); 
Kerrie S. Howze, Medical Tourism: Symptom or Cure?, 41 GA. L. REV. 1013, 1017 (2007).  
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industrialized nations.8  As an illustrative example, the cost of a 
Caesarean section in the United States averages approximately 
$15,041.9  In contrast, the cost of the same procedure in France or 
South Africa is $6,441 and $3,449, respectively.10  These estimates 
indicate U.S. patients could receive a 57% to 78% discount for the 
same treatment by going overseas.  In fact, some research suggests 
that foreign care could undercut U.S. prices by up to 90%.11  Data 
establishing the phenomenal cost savings available to U.S. patients 
by going overseas is overwhelming.12 
In addition to tremendous cost savings, the factor that makes 
medical tourism stand out as an attractive and viable solution for 
the rising cost of health care is the distinct lack of legal and 
regulatory barriers.13  There are virtually no federal laws, state laws, 
or regulations purporting to oversee medical tourism.14  Indeed, 
Texas is the only state that has made any effort to place a legal or 
regulatory restriction on medical tourism.15  In 2007, the Texas 
Insurance Department promulgated a regulation that prohibits “[a] 
health benefit plan issuer [from issuing or offering for sale] a health 
benefit plan that requires an enrollee to travel to a foreign country to 
receive a particular health care service . . . .”16  However, the language 
 
 8  See, e.g., Susan Adler Channick, Health Care Cost Containment: No Longer an 
Option but a Mandate, 13 NEV. L. J. 792, 792–805 (2013) (explaining the unsustainable 
trajectory of U.S. health costs).   
 9  Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. TIMES, July 
1, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-
way-of-birth-costliest-in-the-world.html. 
 10  Id.  
 11  Christopher J. Brady, Offshore Gambling: Medical Outsourcing Versus ERISA’s 
Fiduciary Duty Requirement, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073, 1107 (2007).  
 12  See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 9 (comparing the cost of delivering a child in the 
United States to six other countries); Williams, supra note 7, at 613; Mohd Jamal 
Alsharif, Ronald Labonté & Zuxun Lu, Patients Beyond Borders: A Study of Medical Tourists 
in Four Countries, 10 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 315, 325 (2010); Thomas R. McLean, The Global 
Market for Health Care: Economics and Regulation, 26 WIS. INT’L L. J. 591, 596–97 (2008); 
Brady, supra note 11, at 1094. 
 13  See I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36 (2011) (“True, the U.S. government has not taken steps to prevent 
travel to India for medical procedures . . . .”); Angeleque Parsiyar, Medical Tourism: The 
Commodification of Health Care in Latin America, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 379, 397 (2009) 
(stating that there is currently no formal regulation of the medical tourist industry). 
 14  Cohen, supra note 13, at 36 (“In medical tourism by patients paying out of 
pocket, we do not have the U.S. government or international bodies directly creating 
push and pull factors.”); see also Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging 
Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L. J. 71, 81–
90 (2008) (describing recent trends that facilitate medical tourism). 
 15  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1216.004 (West 2009). 
 16  Id. (emphasis added). 
CHOU FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  9:01 PM 
190 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
of the regulation only prohibits insurance companies or employers 
from requiring out of country care.17  Put differently, providing an 
overseas health care option concomitantly with domestic care is 
permissible.18  In the same vein, California is the only state to have 
officially sanctioned medical tourism.19 
In the absence of legal limitations, various insurance company 
pilot programs incentivize patients to use medical tourism 
options.20  Guion’s case is hardly unique.21  As early as 2006, Blue 
Ridge, a self-insured manufacturer of paper products, offered to 
send one of its employees to India to undergo elective shoulder 
surgery to correct a rotator cuff injury and to have his gallbladder 
removed.22  The company stood to save approximately $80,000 and 
offered to share $10,000 of the savings with the employee.23  In this 
respect, medical tourism is recognized as a “trade-off for consumers, 
allowing patients to opt out of increased regulation in favor of looser 
restrictions and greater cost savings.”24 
Despite the undeniable cost savings, numerous scholars have 
theorized that medical tourism, if widespread, could result in 
 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id.  As of this writing, the matter has never been litigated.  
 19  The California regulation states that a Mexican health plan may treat a California 
citizen provided that the Mexican health provider obtains proper state licensure.  CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2(a) (West 2008); Rebecca Bennie, Medical Tourism: A 
Look at How Medical Outsourcing Can Reshape Health Care, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 583, 597 
n.145 (2014); see also Cortez, supra note 14, at 100 (“Three insurers in California pay 
for U.S. residents to obtain care in Mexico.”) (citation omitted). 
 20  For example, the Medical Tourism Association’s website references a pilot 
program with the goal of “certifying medical tourism facilitators.”  Roy G. Spece, Jr. 
Medical Tourism: Protecting Patients from Conflicts of Interest in Broker’s Fees Paid by Foreign 
Providers, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 16 n.73 (2010) (citation omitted); see also 
Brady, supra note 11, at 1103 (referencing the 2006 Blue Ridge Paper Products 
incident); MAGGI ANN GRACE, STATE OF THE HEART: A MEDICAL TOURIST’S TRUE STORY OF 
LIFESAVING SURGERY IN INDIA (2007) (referencing the mitral valve replacement of 
Howard Staab in New Delhi); Walecia Konrad, Going Abroad to Find Affordable Health 
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/03/21/health/21patient.html. 
 21  See infra notes 22–24, 26 and accompanying text. 
 22  Walecia Konrad, Employers Make a Push for ‘Medical Tourism’, FORTUNE SMALL BUS. 
MAG., May 1, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/ magazines/fsb/fsbarchive/ 
2007/05/01/100003808/; Saritha Rai, Union Disrupts Plan To Send Ailing Workers to 
India for Cheaper Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/business/worldbusiness/11health.html.  
 23  However, at the last minute, the United Steelworker’s Union threatened to bring 
a lawsuit alleging that foreign surgical facilities would provide substandard medical 
care.  McLean, supra note 12, at 600. 
 24  See Williams, supra note 7, at 611 (emphasis added). 
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devastating effects to the global health care framework.25  As a result 
of these potentially negative effects, these scholars have warned 
against wholesale adoption of medical tourism as a health access 
solution.26  However, the warnings of the academic community, 
while troubling, have not been able to halt medical tourism’s rapid 
expansion.27  Medical tourism has already taken off as an 
increasingly important piece of the health care delivery puzzle.28  In 
fact, since health care costs will remain high in the future, medical 
tourism will likely continue.29  Arguably, it must continue in order 
 
 25  See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 269, 294–298 (2010) (suggesting that while medical tourism has the 
potential to dramatically reshape health delivery vis-à-vis cost, it also creates issues of 
access inequality); Nathan Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health 
Care, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 41 (2010) (“Though medical tourism draws 
new revenues to Thailand, critics argue that it crowds out the medical care available to 
ordinary Thais.”); Tyler Grant, Note, Made in America: Medical Tourism and Birth Tourism 
Leading to a Larger Base of Transient Citizenship, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 159, 170 (2015) 
(“As Taiwan-China relations improve, and the Taiwanese economy worsens, an 
increasing number of Taiwanese citizens are using their dual citizenships in the United 
States, Australia, and other countries to work abroad and then return to Taiwan for 
cheap medical treatment.”). 
 26  See Cohen, supra note 13, at 6–7 (stating that medical tourism is limited by 
certain moral or “global justice” obligations of source countries towards destination 
countries); see also M. Neil Browne, Chelsea K. Brown & Facundo Bouzat, American 
Medical Tourism: Regulating a Cure That Can Damage Consumer Health, 25 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 319, 339–47 (2013) (stating that medical tourism is limited by the 
comparative health, legal, and regulatory risks incurred by overseas patients).  This 
Note recognizes that the medical tourism industry is not yet fully mature, but evidence 
shows that issues of quality of care seem to be unfounded.  See, e.g., Elisabeth 
Rosenthal, In Need of a New Hip, but Priced Out of the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/health/for-medical-tourists-simple-math.html 
(stating that while some tourists’ destinations—the article studied Belgium—lack 
amenities, infection rates are lower than in the United States, possibly indicating a 
difference in quality); Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health 
Care Costs?: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 12–13 (2006) 
(statement of Magi Ann Grace). 
 27  See Vadim Schick, Data Privacy Concerns for U.S. Healthcare Enterprises’ Overseas 
Ventures, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 173, 175 (2011) (“In this regard, India’s medical 
tourism sector is expected to grow 30 percent annually from 2009 to 2015”); Maria 
Lenhart, Survey Sees Robust Growth for Medical Tourism, TRAVEL MARKET REPORT (Apr. 4, 
2013), http://www.travelmarketreport.com/articles/Survey-Sees-Robust-Growth-for-
Medical-Tourism (“Sixty percent of respondents to the Medical Tourism Climate 
Survey 2013 reported growth in international patients during the past 12 months.”). 
 28  McLean, supra note 12, at 599 (suggesting that the global market for medical 
tourism already has economic clout).  See also Bennie, supra note 19, at 587. 
 29  See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-us-
leads-the-world-in-health-expenditures.html (stating that health care spending is “still 
expected to rise faster than the gross domestic product”). 
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to ensure access to health care.30  The problem then becomes how 
medical tourism will scale to take advantage of its reduced costs, 
while recognizing the harm to the global health care framework. 
This Note addresses the specific problem that medical tourism 
poses to the global health care framework.  It then proposes a 
solution to that problem through a regulatory mechanism.  Part II 
describes volume shock, a key danger of medical tourism to the 
global health framework, and a problem that could potentially 
destabilize the current medical tourism system causing service 
shortages to U.S. patients.  Part III describes the proposed solution 
to this problem involving a two stage regulatory mechanism.  This 
regulatory mechanism theorizes that de minimis regulation coupled 
with patient behavior can be used to internally self-regulate medical 
tourism.  Specifically, the effect of moral hazard and patient 
trepidation may operate to limit patient volume without a 
tremendously complex regulatory scheme.31  Should de minimis 
regulation fail, Part III proposes various theories that could be 
helpful in determining the outer boundaries of a replacement 
regulatory scheme.  Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE VOLUME SHOCK PROBLEM 
Although medical tourism has been growing, there is no 
consensus regarding a marked negative effect to American patients 
or destination health delivery.32  Consequently, it may very well be 
that the recent observed growth of health tourism is simply a 
product of increasing globalization in a digital age, health care 
included.33  If so, this Note is not objecting to globalization itself.  
Rather, this Note explores the concept of volume shock—a rapid 
increase in patient volume causing the failure of both global and 
 
 30  Williams, supra note 7, at 611. 
 31  See discussion infra Part III(B). 
 32  See, e.g., Y.Y. Brandon Chen & Colleen M. Flood, Medical Tourism’s Impact on 
Health Care Equity and Access in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Making the Case for 
Regulation, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 287 (2013) (“[T]here appears to be consensus 
among academics that current understanding about medical tourism and its effects . . . 
largely derives from ‘theory, assumption or conjecture.’”); Pasquale, supra note 25, at 
273 (“Medical tourism has dual effects . . . both diverting doctors away from 
indigenous populations and supplying capital that may build health infrastructure in 
those nations.”). 
 33  See Cohen, supra note 13, at 7 (suggesting that medical tourism is part of a larger 
move toward the globalization of health care, but also including such phenomena as 
“brain drain,” medical outsourcing, research tourism, and parallel trade in approved 
pharmaceuticals).  See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (1st 
ed. 2007) (discussing economic globalization and its effect on developing nations). 
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domestic health care frameworks—and to what extent it may be 
monitored and limited. 
Previous scholarship has described the danger of medical 
tourism and its effect on the tripartite concerns of quality, cost, and 
access.34   Certainly, these factors can be used to explain the medical 
tourism problem.35  However, this Note uses the singular factor—
patient volume—to discuss the effect of medical tourism on U.S. 
health care. 
Medical tourism serves an increasingly important role as a relief 
valve for the U.S. health care economy.36  Arguably, since at least 
2006, medical tourism has provided an avenue of financial relief to 
those individuals otherwise priced out of the U.S. health system.37  
Medical tourism already provides a powerful alternative for 
obtaining cheap health care.  Any corrective action to modify its 
current course should take into account its benefit to the U.S. public 
without adhering to an abstract notion of global justice.38  However, 
there is a reason to curb medical tourism’s expansion.  As the 
popularity of medical tourism grows, the volume of patients will 
grow proportionately, presenting a threat to the U.S. health care 
 
 34  The sources that describe these effects are numerous.  They generally indicate 
that quality of care is more of a perceived issue than an actual issue.  In fact, the quality 
of care received by individuals like Guion is often on par with or superior to the care 
received in the United States.  See Ask a Patient: Americans Turn to Medical Tourism for 
Healthcare Relief, supra note 1.  See also Cortez, supra note 14, at 82–86.  As described 
above, cost of care in destination countries is usually significantly reduced. See supra 
notes 8–12 and accompanying text.  Volume and volume shock as discussed in this 
Note has the most noticeable effect on health care access.  See Cortez, supra note 14, at 
108.  Access is also perhaps the most difficult term to define in health law.  Martin 
Gulliford et al., What Does ‘Access to Health Care’ Mean?, 7 J. HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH & 
POLICY 186, 186–88 (2002).  However, while it is true that international care decreases 
geographic access, the significant reduction in cost results in an overall increase in 
access to care from a financial standpoint.  For a more nuanced discussion of how 
medical tourism affects health care access, see Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: 
The Emerging Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. 
L.J. 71, 107–14 (2008). 
 35  See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 108. 
 36  See Rosenthal, supra note 26; Bennie, supra note 19, at 587 (“The allure of low-
cost medical care to potential medical tourists is undeniable, especially to the 
uninsured and underinsured.”); Cortez, supra note 14, at 77 (“In India alone, the 
number of medical tourists visiting the country tripled between 2002 and 2006, and is 
expected to rise by 600% over the next few years.”). 
 37  See Brady, supra note 11, at 1103 (discussing Blue Ridge Paper Products, the first 
widely publicized medical tourism case).  Cf. Cortez, supra note 14, at 77 (suggesting 
that medical tourist data has been available since 2002). 
 38  See Cohen, supra note 13 (discussing the effect of health tourism from a global 
justice perspective). 
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system.39  Scholars have yet to articulate the parallel problem that 
medical tourism poses in the United States and other source 
countries.40  The general substance of this problem follows. 
Currently, a large portion of funding for community hospitals, 
especially emergency departments—the U.S. health safety net—
comes from cross-subsidized specialty care.41  Although the 
phenomenon is complex, the general thrust is that revenue 
generated from specialty departments, such as neurology, 
cardiology, and orthopedic surgery is used to keep “unprofitable” 
but socially desirable services, namely emergency departments, 
afloat.42 
As the cost of health care rises, more people will be priced out 
of domestic private insurance.43  Without domestic health care 
options, individuals who have been priced out will increasingly seek 
care overseas due to the attractive prices of medical tourism.44  This 
Note posits that as the amount of patients seeking international 
solutions for medical care increases, the number of patients 
requiring domestic specialty care decreases.  Less specialty care 
patients means less overall revenue for community hospitals, 
jeopardizing the cross-subsidization scheme of hospital emergency 
departments.45  The potential for medical tourism to cause the 
 
 39  See discussion infra Part II. 
 40  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 13; Chen & Flood, supra note 32, at 288–90 
(discussing how health tourism may create increased competition for health resources 
between foreign patients and domestic patients but not discussing the effect to 
domestic—or source—health services). 
 41 See Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1994) (“The emergency rooms of American hospitals have 
frequently become the principal suppliers of nonurgent primary care to the under- and 
uninsured.”).  See also Elizabeth Weeks, After the Catastrophe: Disaster Relief for Hospitals, 
85 N.C.L. REV. 223, 231 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
 42  See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING 
HEALTHCARE, 65–66 (2006) (“Patients covered by the public sector are subsidized by 
private sector patients.  Within the private sector, patients enrolled in large health plans 
are perversely subsidized by members of small groups, the uninsured, and out-of-
network patients, who pay higher [than] even list prices.”).  Guy David et al., Do 
Hospitals Cross Subsidize?, 37 J. HEALTH ECONOMICS 198 (2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17300.pdf; Suzanne Strothkamp, Understanding the 
Physician-Owned Specialty Hospital Phenomenon: The Confluence of DRG Payment 
Methodology and Physician Self-Referral Laws, 38 J. HEALTH L. 673, 677–82, 684–85 
(2005). 
 43  See Bennie, supra note 19, at 587 (“In the face of prohibitively high healthcare 
costs, Americans are traveling abroad for medical care by the hundreds of 
thousands . . . .”). 
 44  Id. 
 45  This parallels the debate over the rise of single specialty hospitals in the late 
1990s.  See, e.g., Unmesh Kher, The Hospital Wars, TIME, Dec. 05, 2006; Mike J. Wyatt, 
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failure of domestic health delivery systems is the volume shock 
problem.  In the worst case scenario, dwindling cross-subsidization 
will cause hospital emergency departments to close.46 
An effective medical tourism regulatory scheme must balance 
two competing interests.  On the one hand, medical tourism can be 
used as a tool to increase the access of individuals to medically 
necessary (or eventually medically necessary) procedures.47  On the 
other hand, medical tourism must be monitored so that action can 
be taken to avoid volume shock.  This Note proposes a methodology 
to balance these opposing interests. 
Before presenting any theory on regulatory structure, it is 
important to recognize that volume shock is peculiarly affected by a 
patient’s ability to pay for care.48  Thus, any discussion of where 
volume shock potentially originates must begin with a discussion of 
health insurance.49  Essentially, three broad categories of individuals 
benefit from medical tourism.50  At one extreme, there are those with 
insurance, either public or private, that will cover the cost of a 
procedure without any co-payment on the part of the consumer.51 
These individuals are not addressed by this Note as they will 
invariably receive domestic treatment and therefore have little 
overall effect on total patient volume. 
That leaves two types of individuals who receive medical care 
overseas.52  The first involves uninsured or underinsured 
 
Leveling the Healing Field: Specialty Hospital Legal Reform as a Cure for an Ailing Health 
Care System, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 547 (2007). 
 46  See generally David et al., supra note 42; Mona Al-Amin et al., Specialty Hospital 
Market Proliferation: Strategic Implications for General Hospitals, 35 HEALTH CARE MGMT. 
REV. 294, 298–99 (2010) (discussing the negative economic effect of single specialty 
hospitals on non-profit general hospitals with emergency departments). 
 47  Cf. Cortez, supra note 14, at 108 (“[M]edical tourism should improve access to 
care for two significant populations: the uninsured and the underinsured.”). 
 48  See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 26 (expanding on pricing problems and the 
reluctance of insurers to pay for procedures). 
 49  Id. 
 50  This is based loosely on the framework proposed by Kopson.  See Mark S. 
Kopson, Medical Tourism: Implications for Providers and Plans, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 
147, 159–62 (2010). 
 51  One such example of public health insurance is Medicare and Medicaid. 
According to a statistical brief by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
Medicare pays for the cost of approximately 63.4% of all hip replacements; Medicaid 
pays for 6.8%.  Combined, federal health programs pay for over 70% of all hip 
replacements in the U.S.  CHAYA MERRILL & ANNE ELIXHAUSER, HOSPITAL STAYS INVOLVING 
MUSCULOSKELETAL PROCEDURES, at 9 (2007), available at http://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb34.pdf (based on data available from 2004). 
 52  Note that this model is an oversimplification: it assumes that income 
demographics are classifiable into discrete buckets, although the demographics of 
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individuals.53  These individuals cannot afford domestic health 
insurance but may have the savings to obtain treatment abroad.54  
The second involves insured individuals being incentivized to take 
part in overseas treatment as part of their insurance plans: what this 
Note refers to as the incentivized insured.55  This latter group poses 
the greatest threat to the global health framework because it has the 
potential to inflate patient volume tremendously.56  These two 
groups can each be further divided into three sub-groups, giving a 
total of six groups. 
Uninsured or underinsured individuals: 
—- seeking purely medically unnecessary care 
—- seeking eventually medically necessary care 
—- seeking medically necessary care 
Insured individuals being incentivized to take part in medical 
tourism programs: 
—- seeking purely medically unnecessary care 
—- seeking eventually medically necessary care 
—- seeking medically necessary care 
A. Eliminating Types of Treatment from the Framework Analysis 
For uninsured or underinsured individuals seeking medically 
necessary care overseas the system should remain intact.  Assuming 
that medical tourism ought to be used as a device to increase access 
to medically necessary health services, it is axiomatic to conclude 
that the law should not prohibit individuals from taking advantage 
of potentially lifesaving care.57  In fact, this sort of care should be 
 
income likely exist as a continuum.  Further, this model fails to recognize the impact 
of medical tourism on undocumented immigrants, a conversation that is, regrettably, 
beyond the scope of this Note.  However, it is useful for the purposes of illustration to 
consider how these groups affect the medical tourism economy. 
 53  I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the Patient-
Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1473 (2010) (indicating the possibility of 
medical tourism growth from uninsured and underinsured patients). 
 54  Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?: 
Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 3–5 (2006) (testimony of Magi 
Ann Grace). 
 55  See also Cohen, supra note 53, at 1473 (dubbing the same phenomenon 
“insurer-prompted medical tourism”).  Cohen also demarcates treatment as invasive, 
diagnostic, or lifestyle.  “Lifestyle” ostensibly includes “nutrition, weight reduction and 
anti-aging treatments” and in this case may be a subset of the type of treatment 
described in this Note as “medically unnecessary.”  Cohen supra note 53, at 1479–80.  
It is unclear how treatment containing an invasive element and a lifestyle element, e.g., 
facelifts, are properly categorized under the framework established by Cohen.  
 56  Id. at 1486. 
 57  This is especially true if the care is preventative care or non-emergency care, 
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prioritized.58  This is especially true where domestic markets have 
failed by pricing out their own consumers.59 
Since underinsured and uninsured patients lack sufficient 
insurance to cover a given procedure, they cannot obtain care 
domestically.60  Where the individual can afford to have the 
procedure done overseas, it seems unduly restrictive to force the 
individual to wait until the procedure is medically necessary (and 
therefore covered by insurance) to obtain it.  In these situations, 
patients seeking eventually medically necessary care face the same 
problem as patients seeking medically necessary care.61  Attempting 
to bar such care would deny access to health care that is obtainable. 
Despite the connotation that uninsured and underinsured 
patients are less financially well off (compared to insured patients) 
and therefore more in need of health care coverage, medical tourism 
as a treatment option for these groups should not be absolute.  The 
subgrouping above makes an important distinction between purely 
medically unnecessary care and eventually medically necessary care.  
Individuals who are uninsured or underinsured may still be less 
“deserving” of treatment if what they are seeking amounts to purely 
medically unnecessary care. 62  This distinction is a way of triaging 
 
which most medical tourism is.  See Tony Hope, Rationing and Life-Saving Treatments: 
Should Identifiable Patients Have Higher Priority?, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 179, 183–84 (2001) 
(stating that preventative care is both ethically and financially more efficient than 
“rescue” care).  Cf. Cortez, supra note 14, at 89 (stating that many medical tourists 
cannot receive emergency treatment overseas because they may be too frail or ill to 
travel). 
 58  Cf. David et al., supra note 42, at 29–30 (espousing the benefits of community 
hospitals in providing socially desirable—though financially uncompensated—care).  
The priority of lifesaving care has been a hotly debated ethical issue.  See, e.g., Eleanor 
D. Kinney, Realizing the International Human Right to Health: The Challenge of For-Profit 
Health Care, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 49, 56-57 (2010) (discussing the development of a 
rights-based approach or entitlement to health care). 
 59  See Rosenthal, supra note 26 (presenting the case of Michael Shopenn, a 67 year 
old photographer and snowboarder priced out of the U.S. health system when 
insurance refused to cover his hip-replacement due to a pre-existing condition). 
 60  See supra note 53. 
 61  Where treatment is integral to patient fitness, the only question that remains is 
when should that treatment be received?  What are the ethical ramifications of allowing 
an individual to suffer while a diagnosis awaits approval for medical necessity?  See 
Rosenthal, supra note 26 (“Mr. Shopenn . . . had been in such pain from arthritis that 
he could not stand long enough to make coffee, let alone work.”). 
 62  There is a tendency to view certain types of care—namely cosmetic—as less 
“deserving” of the type of attention that other non-cosmetic care receives.  Cf. Thomas 
v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 937, 940 (Ill. 1991) (holding that an insurance 
company’s decision to refuse coverage of cosmetic surgery was not arbitrary and 
capricious); 26 U.S.C.A. § 213(d)(9)(A) (West 2011) (“The term ‘medical care’ does 
not include cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or 
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access to medical tourism procedures based on the type of treatment 
sought.  Medically unnecessary care is usually thought of as care that 
is not essential for the purpose of treating affliction.63  This Note 
challenges that existing definition of medically unnecessary.64  
Medically unnecessary care actually encompasses two distinct 
categories: pure medically unnecessary care and eventually medically 
necessary care. 
The best way to illustrate this dichotomy is through a case study 
of lower extremity joint replacements (“LEJRs”), which include knee 
replacements and hip replacements: operations most likely to see a 
surge in demand.65  A knee diagnosed with degenerative 
osteoarthritis may eventually require a total knee replacement 
(“TKR”).66  The patient may choose to undergo the procedure 
preemptively, i.e., before it is explicitly required or indicated.67  In 
this case, the issue of necessity becomes predicated on timing: 
should the knee be operated on now or later?  Even when the 
procedure is undertaken in order to maintain a certain standard of 
living—a patient undergoes a preemptive TKR to continue playing 
tennis—it remains true that the procedure will be indicated or 
ordered eventually.68  Advances in medical technology and the 
longevity of artificial implants means that a procedure done earlier 
will likely increase quality of life with no materially negative effect 
 
procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a 
congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or 
disfiguring disease.”). 
 63  Liza Khan, Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal Norms, Insurance Markets, 
and the Threat of Healthcare Reform, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 375, 399 (2011) 
(“Medically unnecessary interventions include, but are not limited to, procedures 
insurers conclude are cosmetic or experimental.  The medical-necessity requirement is 
at once the broadest and least defined exclusion clause in most insurance plans.”).  
 64  See Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?: 
Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Magi 
Ann Grace)  available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hr159mg.pdf 
(alleging that an insurance company would not pay for a removal of a tooth until it 
had been “impacted and abscessed”). 
 65  See Rosenthal, supra note 26 (“With baby boomers determined to continue 
skiing, biking and running into their 60s and beyond, economists predict a surge in 
joint replacement surgeries . . . .”).  
 66  PEGGY A. HOUGLUM, THERAPEUTIC EXERCISE FOR MUSCULOSKELETAL INJURIES (3d ed. 
2010), available at http://www.humankinetics.com/excerpts/excerpts/total-knee-
replacement-for-treatment-of-knee-osteoarthritis (detailing total knee replacement 
treatment for knee osteoarthritis). 
 67  See Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Need of a New Hip, but Priced Out of the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/health/for-medical-
tourists-simple-math.html. 
 68  Special thanks to Professor John Jacobi who first provided insight into this 
particular angle. 
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even if the procedure is undertaken before it is “medically 
necessary.”69  The practical effect of distinguishing a treatment that 
is eventually medically necessary from one that is purely medically 
necessary is very close to zero.  The mere fact that an individual has 
not yet been medically authorized to receive a procedure does not 
obviate the eventual need for such a procedure.70  When a patient 
chooses to preemptively undergo a procedure before his or her 
fitness fails, it is said to be “eventually medically necessary.”71 
This is in contrast to a procedure undertaken purely for 
aesthetic or cosmetic reasons.72  For example, procedures such as 
non-corrective rhinoplasty or breast augmentation are purely 
medically unnecessary.73  While there is an argument that so long as 
the procedure is eventually undertaken the patient should remain a 
consumer of domestic health care, such an argument is tenuous.  
This is especially true because a majority of insurers (including 
Medicare and Medicaid) will not pay for procedures deemed 
medically unnecessary.74 
Returning to the example of LEJR, an insurance company will 
likely refuse to pay for the procedure even if it is eventually needed.75  
In fact, a CMS memo published in 2012 states that “[major joint 
replacement surgery: hip and knee] is reserved for patients whose 
symptoms have not responded to other treatments.”76  However, an 
 
 69  See Rosenthal, supra note 26 (“Some [artificial implants] use more durable 
materials so that a patient requiring a hip implant at age 40 or 50 might rely on it 
longer than the standard 20 years . . . .”). 
 70  Id. 
 71  See infra discussion accompanying Part II. 
 72  See supra note 62. 
 73  Despite the advantages of using LEJR as an illustrative example, I cannot 
conceive of an LEJR being undertaken for cosmetic or aesthetic reasons. 
 74  Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?: 
Hearing before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Magi 
Ann Grace) (“It is, of course, a mistake to say that our government does not provide 
[uninsured or underinsured] people with healthcare.  We do.  Only we do it in what 
may be the least efficient, the most expensive and least effective way possible: by 
refusing to provide any necessary care until a patient’s illness becomes a medical 
emergency.”). 
 75  Id. See also Rosenthal, supra note 26 (stating that treatment for a joint 
replacement costing at least $78,000, not including the surgeon’s fee, was denied by an 
insurance company because it was related to a pre-existing condition). 
 76  Memorandum from the Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. on Documenting 
Med. Necessity for Major Joint Replacement (Hip and Knee) (Sept. 17, 2012), available 
at https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/ 
MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/SE1236.pdf (“CMS recognizes that joint replacement 
surgery is reserved for patients whose symptoms have not responded to other 
treatments.  To avoid denial of claims for major joint replacement surgery [hip and 
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individual electing to undergo an LEJR despite the contrary opinion 
of his or her insurance company may have the discretionary income 
to pay for at least part of the procedure out of pocket.  A patient in 
this position may choose from two options. 
The first option is to remain in the U.S. and receive treatment 
domestically.  But this route is practically infeasible.  The cost of a 
TKR in the United States is approximately $25,398.77  The cost of a 
total hip replacement (“THR”) is approximately $26,489.78  Given 
the tremendous cost of care, is it unlikely that domestic treatment 
without insurance will be a viable solution.79 
The second option is to go overseas, where the same treatment 
could cost thousands of dollars less.80  In a 2013 report, the 
International Federation of Health Plans estimated that the cost of 
THR is $8,010 in Spain, amounting to a savings of approximately 
70%.81  The realistic option for individuals receiving medically 
unnecessary care is to go overseas, which adversely contributes to 
the total patient volume. 
While eventually medically necessary care is subject to the same 
sort of supporting rationale as medically necessary care, it does not 
command the same level of exigency.  Its priority of care is 
somewhat less than medically necessary care, although higher than 
that of cosmetic care.82  Regardless of priority and the associated 
ethical dilemmas, eventually medically necessary care may still be 
obtained as medically necessary care depending on time.  If care is 
eventually medically necessary, the analysis should parallel 
medically necessary care: there should be no categorical bar on care 
 
knee], the medical records should contain enough detailed information to support the 
determination that major joint replacement surgery was reasonable and necessary for 
the patient.”). 
 77  INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, 2013 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: VARIATION IN 
MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL PRICES BY COUNTRY (2013).  No significant change in price for 
TKR was found between the 2012 report and the 2013 report.  Id.  
 78  Id. at 21 (reporting that the price of a THR went down significantly from $40,364 
in 2012 to $26,489 in 2013, over a 40% reduction in price).  The cause of this decline 
and whether it has any effect on the future of medical tourism is unknown. 
 79  See Williams, supra note 7, at 614 (stating that most individuals seeking medical 
tourism solutions are “lower-middle class”). 
 80  See INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, supra note 77. 
 81  Id. 
 82  See S. R. Mousavi, The Ethics of Aesthetic Surgery, J. CUTANEOUS & AESTHETIC 
SURGERY 38–40 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC2890136/ (suggesting that cosmetic surgery is valuated differently based on why 
it is being undertaken and stating that “[Ma]ny people” experience “real pain, 
discomfort, social handicap and suffering” due to aesthetic appearance, but others 
undergo cosmetic surgery for a “non-existent or minimal cosmetic ‘defect.’”).   
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deemed eventually medically necessary. 
This Note treats “eventually medically necessary care” as 
equivalent to “medically necessary care” for the purposes of 
discussion.  Due to the lack of empirical evidence on the effect of 
medical tourism, there is no clear rationale for separating the two.83  
As patient volume grows and the U.S. health care system contends 
with the possibility of volume shock, eventually medically necessary 
care may be triaged, reduced, or even eliminated based on its 
comparative exigency as compared to medically necessary care.  But 
it is premature to make that determination now. 
B. Restricting Access to Purely Unnecessary Care 
In contrast to “medically necessary” and “eventually medically 
necessary care,” an argument can be made for restricting access to 
purely medically unnecessary care regardless of the patient’s insured 
status.84  The guiding principle behind this argument is that medical 
tourism should be used as a release valve.  Wherever possible, 
medical tourism should not be used to supplant domestic health 
services.  Under this principle there are two rationales for curbing 
medical tourism for purely medically unnecessary care. 
The first justification is utilitarian.  Unlike medically necessary 
care, which is arguably essential to save, prolong, or improve quality 
of life, purely medically unnecessary care (or cosmetic care) is 
principally focused on enhancing appearance and improving 
aesthetics.85  In that respect, purely medically unnecessary care is 
subject more heavily to the law of diminishing returns.86  Whereas 
a sick person may benefit greatly in overall health from receiving 
 
 83 See Cortez, supra note 6, at 70 (stating that current estimates of the frequency of 
medical tourism are unreliable).  See also Nathan Cortez, Embracing the New Geography 
of Health Care: A Novel Way to Cover Those Left Out of Health Reform, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
859, 877–78 (2011) (citing industry studies varying wildly in their estimates of the 
total number medical tourist patients, from five thousand to six million, and noting 
that despite the variation in estimates, “most indicators point toward an unprecedented 
migration of U.S. patients”). 
 84  See, e.g., Liza Khan, Note, Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal Norms, 
Insurance Markets, and the Threat of Healthcare Reform, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
375, 390–91 (citing James P. Jacobson, To Pay or Not To Pay, That is the Question: 
Coverage Disputes Between Health Plans and Members, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 445, 
448–49 (2007) (discussing exclusions for cosmetic and experimental treatments)). 
 85  Christine Nardi, Note, When Health Insurers Deny Coverage for Breast 
Reconstructive Surgery: Gender Meets Disability, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 777, 783 n.34 (1997) 
(“Cosmetic surgery is defined as a procedure ‘performed to reshape normal structures 
of the body in order to improve the patient’s appearance and self-esteem.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 86  See Cohen, supra note 13, at 18–21. 
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medical treatment, even if that treatment is abroad, a healthy person 
seeking cosmetic surgery may not benefit to the same degree.  In 
other words, the total utility of a procedure undertaken for pure 
cosmetic reasons is markedly less than a procedure undertaken for 
a medically necessary purpose. 
Previous literature reveals a correlation between the number of 
medical tourism facilities specializing in a certain procedure and the 
external demand of that procedure.87  Although it is true that this 
relationship is not causative, it is possible that an increase in 
medical tourism for a certain procedure is loosely related to the 
number of medical tourism destinations that provide that 
procedure.  Assuming this assertion is true, increased demand for 
cosmetic surgery encourages the development of cosmetic surgery 
centers.88  By the same token, increased demand for TKRs may 
promote the development of orthopedic surgery centers.89  In this 
example, utility is maximized by establishing an orthopedic surgery 
center rather than a cosmetic surgery center because it allows 
indigenous people to avail themselves of a treatment solution that 
would be more likely to increase overall utility.90 
The second justification is normative.  One goal of this Note is 
to examine a way to use medical tourism to increase access to 
medically necessary care.  Allowing medical tourism for cosmetic 
surgery would do nothing to further this goal.  For example, assume 
that there is a universal threshold for sufficient access to medically 
necessary procedures, i.e., the threshold for receiving “sufficient 
access” is equivalent across countries.  Arguably, an individual 
accessing medical tourism services for cosmetic purposes has 
already met and exceeded the level of sufficient access to medically 
necessary care.91  On the other hand, the vast majority of poor 
 
 87  Cohen, supra note 13, at 18–19. 
 88  Laura Hopkins et al., Medical Tourism Today: What Is the State of Existing 
Knowledge, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 189, 194 (2010). 
 89  Id. at 193 (suggesting that the commercial investment in medical tourism is 
likely what is causing the largest effect on tiered health care access); see also Cohen, 
supra note 13, at 9–10 (stating that the attractive option of providing cosmetic surgery 
to U.S. patients may attract destination physicians away from providing care to the 
indigenous poor).  Cf. Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services, 80 BULL. OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 158, 160 (2002) (stating that investment from corporate medical tourist 
facilities would most likely be diverted towards funding more “high-level technology” 
medical tourist ventures and not towards the public health sector). 
 90  This assumes that the treatment will be available.  But whether the price point 
will be feasible is largely a function of whether public and private services are linked.  
See, e.g., Chanda, supra note 89, at 162. 
 91  Cf. Pasquale, supra note 25, at 305 (implying that cosmetic surgery might in fact 
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patients in destination countries do not have sufficient access to 
medically necessary care.92  Further, there has been no evidence that 
investing in medical tourism in general does anything to promote 
access to care by poorer indigenous individuals.93  In fact, as 
suggested above, foreign investment in medical tourism facilities 
with specialties like cosmetic care may further reduce access of 
indigenous persons to medically necessary care.94  In this case, 
allowing medical tourism for cosmetic care should be questioned 
because it does nothing to raise an indigenous population’s 
threshold to sufficient access of medically necessary care. 
If we assume that there is a threshold for health care access, it 
is likely that an individual seeking cosmetic treatment has already 
met that threshold for access to medically necessary care.  On the 
other hand, a poor destination patient likely has not met that 
threshold for access.  If we are to focus on raising the threshold of 
access, it seems to be a greater investment of resources to raise the 
access levels of individuals who are below the threshold of access 
rather than those who are at or have exceeded this threshold.  In 
 
be a diamond good: a good “valued not necessarily for [its] intrinsic beauty or worth 
but for [its] ability to show off one’s wealth”) (citing Richard Dusansky, Comment, 
Diamonds Are a Government’s Best Friend: Burden-Free Taxes on Goods Valued for Their 
Values, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1285, 1285 (1989) (discussing the economics of taxation on 
“diamond goods”)). 
 92  China and India are representative of the medical tourism industry and the 
availability of health care access to indigenous populations.  See Alsharif et al., supra 
note 12, at 319 (studying the effect of medical tourism on India, China, Jordan and the 
United Arab Emirates); see also IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE INFORMATICS, 
UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE ACCESS IN INDIA 24, 33–36 (2013) (stating that expensive 
private health care facilities significantly reduce overall access and affordability of 
health care in India); “Ticking Time Bombs”: China’s Health Care System Faces Issues of 
Access, Quality and Cost, WHARTON SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, http://knowledge. 
wharton.upenn.edu/article/ticking-time-bombs-chinas-health-care-system-faces-issues 
-of-access-quality-and-cost/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (giving an anecdotal account 
of health care access issues in China); Juan Pablo Gutiérrez et al., Effective Access to 
Health Care in Mexico, 14 BMC HEALTH SERV. RES. 1, 8 (2014) (suggesting with 95% 
confidence that only 51.51% of Mexican citizens have access to effective health care). 
 93  This trickle-down effect assumes that general investment in medical tourism will 
benefit the entire destination country and not only the destination facility.  But this is 
unsubstantiated.  In fact, there seems to be evidence to the contrary—that trickle-down 
economics is not effective in increasing medical tourism access to poorer individuals.  
See Debora Lipson, quoted in ABC Radio National Background Briefing on Medical 
Tourism, Feb. 20, 2005, at http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl? 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/stories/s1308505.htm (“It’s just not the case 
that [profits from medical tourism] are tapped and redirected to health services for the 
poor, it just does not happen.”); see also STIGLITZ, supra note 33, at 23, 273 (stating that 
trickle-down economics has been repeatedly shown to be ineffective). 
 94  Hopkins et al., supra note 88, at 194; see also supra text accompanying notes 87–
89. 
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sum, the use of medical tourism to address medically necessary and 
eventually medically necessary health conditions should not be 
discouraged. 
In brief summary, there are two different groups of persons 
seeking overseas care: (1) individuals who are uninsured or 
underinsured; and (2) the insurance incentivized.  In addition, each 
group can be further separated into three sub-groups based on the 
type of care they are seeking.  However based on the analysis above, 
it would be ethically difficult to refuse lifesaving treatment for 
uninsured or underinsured individuals.95  In contrast, it is justifiable 
to remove cosmetic or purely medically unnecessary operations 
insofar as they: (1) do not markedly increase the volume of patients 
traveling abroad for medical tourism; and (2) because medically 
unnecessary care tends to raise utilitarian and normative issues.96  
We are left then with the question of how regulation can apply to 
limit volume shock from insurance incentivized individuals seeking 
medically necessary or eventually medically necessary care.  Given 
this landscape, how can a regulatory environment be constructed to 
allow the growth of medical tourism, while simultaneously limiting 
damage to the global health care framework? 
III. DESIGNING A REGULATORY SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF VOLUME SHOCK 
Currently, because the detrimental impact of medical tourism 
to destination countries is unclear, there is no reason to categorically 
eliminate access to medical tourism services. 97  Medical tourism 
services can serve as a relief valve for priced out customers where 
domestic health care markets have failed.98  However, this Note, 
along with previous literature, recognizes that medical tourism is 
also accompanied by numerous dangers.99  Rampant medical 
tourism may lead to widespread failures of the global health care 
framework.100 
 
 95  See discussion supra Part II.  Florida v. United States, 648 F.3d 1235, 1358 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (citing EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd) (“[N]early all hospitals are required 
by law to provide emergency services to anyone, regardless of ability to pay.”). 
 96  See discussion supra Part II. 
 97  See generally, Chen & Flood, supra note 32, at 287 n.14 (“[T]here appears to be 
consensus among academics that current understanding about medical tourism and its 
effects on LMICs [low- and middle-income countries] largely derives from ‘theory, 
assumption or conjecture.’”).  
 98  See supra note 36–40. 
 99  See Browne et al., supra note 26, at 325–46 (discussing dangers stemming from 
the lack of regulations in medical tourism overseas). 
 100  See discussion supra Part II. 
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One solution to this threat is to create a regulatory mechanism 
that does not eradicate the practice of medical tourism, but instead 
actively minimizes the risk of volume shock by adjusting outbound 
patient volume.  This part will describe a two stage regulatory system 
that attempts to accomplish this goal.  This solution will be applied 
to the two categories of medical tourism beneficiaries enumerated 
above: (1) uninsured and underinsured patients and (2) patients 
being incentivized by insurance programs.101 
The first stage is intended as an immediate patch: a temporary 
solution that may become permanent if no further intervention is 
necessary.  The second stage is intended to address the long-term 
problem and consists of more invasive regulatory procedures.  The 
mechanics of the second stage of the regulatory scheme are not 
constructed in this Note.  Rather, various control mechanisms are 
suggested and the reader is invited to consider the contours of a 
more comprehensive regulatory solution. 
A. The Context of Medical Tourism Regulation 
In the first stage, the United States should adopt a self-
interested philosophy by passively or prospectively applying 
regulation while not discouraging the use of medical tourism.  As 
suggested above, the market has already embraced medical tourism 
as a release valve for the ever-increasing cost of health care.102  In 
fact, the utility of medical tourism, especially in its lower costs, 
arguably cannot be disregarded due to increasing reliance on foreign 
care.103  Recognizing these substantial cost savings, the next obvious 
step is to encourage the use of medical tourism as a solution to the 
problem of cost in health care; however, this is precisely what health 
policymakers should avoid.  Due to volume shock and the various 
externalities generated by significant reliance on foreign medical 
frameworks, medical tourism is not a solution.104  Allowing insurance 
 
 101  See discussion supra Part II (discussing categorization of medical tourism 
beneficiaries based on insurance and treatment sought). 
 102  See discussion supra Part II, especially notes 36–39.  Much existing literature has 
documented the expansion of the medical tourism market, suggesting that consumers 
have embraced medical tourism as a viable alternative to receiving domestic treatment.  
See, e.g., Thomas McLean, The Global Market for Health Care: Economics and Regulation, 
26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 591, 596 (2008) (“Until this current crisis in health insurance 
affordability is resolved, it is likely to drive the expansion of the medical tourism 
market.”) (footnote omitted) . 
 103 See, e.g., Cohen supra note 53, at 1525 (stating that a ban on medical tourism for 
uninsured Americans would prevent access to nonemergency health care). 
 104 Cohen supra note 53, at 1526. 
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companies to treat medical tourism as anything more than a 
temporary fix or alternative to care will create a tremendous flood 
of outward bound patients.  The regulation this Note proposes seeks 
to limit volume shock by giving patients the option to choose 
between foreign and domestic care. 
Currently, the main factor delaying volume shock is the federal 
government’s reluctance to allow foreign health providers to 
administer federal health programs.  Federal health programs 
prohibit approximately 41.1 million Medicare beneficiaries from 
receiving health care outside the United States.105  The elderly people 
who receive Medicare benefits require a higher level of medical 
attention.106  It follows that, as the population ages, this would 
create a huge demand for cheaply priced medical care.107  However, 
because the federal government prohibits medical tourism as a 
treatment option under Medicare, the total outbound patient 
volume in foreign health systems remains insulated from this 
potential flood of patients.108  This same line of reasoning can be 
applied to Medicaid beneficiaries—approximately 48.6 million 
 
 105 CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLMENT FOR AGED BENEFICIARIES: 
AS OF JULY 1, 2012 (2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareEnrpts/Downloads/12Aged.pdf 
(stating that the total number of Medicare beneficiaries is 41,116,359).  But see, HENRY 
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TOTAL NUMBER OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (2012), available at 
http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/ (stating that the 
total number of Medicare beneficiaries in 2012 was 48,711,844).  Statistics from U.S. 
territories have been removed to offer a better comparison with data generated by CMS. 
 106  BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 534 (2013) 
(“The population of the United States is steadily aging, and older people, particularly 
those over 80, require a great deal of health care.”).  But see Joseph White, (How) is 
Aging a Health Policy Problem?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 47, 48 (2004) 
(“[P]olicymakers and citizens need not worry about the implications of aging for 
medical costs.  Aging of the population has some effect on health costs, but a much 
smaller effect than those factors that are both more susceptible to manipulation and 
pose less difficult ethical dilemmas.”). 
 107  See Mark S. Kopson, Medical Tourism: Implications for Providers and Plans, 3 J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 147, 163–64 (2010) (describing Medicare beneficiaries as 
“members of the fastest growing portion of the U.S. population”); see also FURROW ET 
AL., supra note 106, at 534.  While both Furrow et al. and White, talk about the effect 
of aging vis-à-vis cost, it is important to see that cost is not necessarily entirely 
coincidental with demand.  The fact that services cost more, or less, than “our 
perception” is not related to the overall demand for services.  See White, supra note 106, 
at 49. 
 108  42 C.F.R. § 411.9(a) (2015) states the basic rule that “Medicare does not pay for 
services furnished outside the United States.”  Subsection 1 then defines “United 
States” as “the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
Guam, American Samoa, The Northern Mariana Islands, and for purposes of services 
rendered on board ship, the territorial waters adjoining the land areas of the United 
States.” 
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persons.109 
Federal health programs provide at least two self-regulatory 
checks on medical tourism.  First, as discussed above, federal health 
programs literally prevent volume shock.110  Millions of persons 
receiving federal health benefits are incentivized not to receive care 
overseas because federal health programs simply do not pay for it.111 
Second, so long as federal health programs do not adopt 
medical tourism, its application in insurance plans will be stunted.  
A government sanction promoting the use of medical tourism as a 
solution to rising health costs would likely end the current model 
of medical tourism as a relief valve.  Government sanction of such 
plans would bring medical tourism provisions out of experimental 
status and accelerate the industry towards unsustainability.112  The 
sheer volume of patients under the Medicare/Medicaid umbrella 
illustrates the significant role that federal health programs have in 
controlling the potential outbound patient flood.  An uncontrolled 
increase in the volume of medical tourism services would cause 
serious problems for the health framework that exists today.  
Therefore, while the United States should recognize the positive cost 
effect of medical tourism, official sanction to promote its use should 
be discouraged.  Consequently, insurance companies will question 
the feasibility of adopting medical tourism in force in the absence 
of government sanction, further stemming patient volume from the 
incentivized insured. 
  
 
 109  KAISER HEALTH NEWS, CENSUS BUREAU: AMERICANS ON MEDICAID STEADY AS POVERTY 
RISES (2011), available at http://khn.org/morning-breakout/census-data-on-health-
coverage/. 
 110  See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
 111  Whether federal health programs provide adequate incentive for patients to 
remain in the domestic health network is a matter that is open for interpretation. 
 112  See, e.g., Adam Teicholz & Glenn Cohen, Some Insurance Companies Ask Their 
Customers to Cross the Border for Care: Is the Practice Going to Spread?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 
7, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118546/some-insurance-companies-
ask-customers-cross-border-care (suggesting that the practice of offering cross-border 
care is a relatively new phenomenon); Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism 
Reduce Health Care Costs?: Hearing before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 18 
(2006) (statement of Arnold Milstein, M.D.); Cortez, supra note 14, at 121 (“Several 
U.S. employers and insurers are beginning to experiment with cross-border health 
insurance coverage . . . .  Yet, this momentum has stalled in at least one instance.”) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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B. Making the Case for De Minimis Regulation 
In order to limit volume, the United States should not take 
action that sanctions or appears to sanction private medical tourism.  
However, that is not to say that Congress must remain idle.  Rather, 
a federal statute or regulation can be implemented to control the 
supply of patients while still refraining from a medical tourism 
endorsement.  That is to say, policy makers should create barriers 
that prevent insurance companies from allowing U.S. patients to 
contribute, unchecked, to the overall volume of medical tourism 
patients.  
This can be accomplished via federal regulation analogous to 
that adopted by the Texas legislature prohibiting insurers from 
providing medical tourism as the only available treatment option.113  
Recall Texas Insurance Code § 1216.004, which states that no 
insurance provider may “require[] an enrollee to travel to a foreign 
country to receive a particular health care service.”114  Under Texas 
law, while an insurance company may include a provision allowing 
treatment to be provided overseas, a domestic alternative must be 
made available.  Essentially, this gives insured patients the option 
to choose whether they will receive care domestically or abroad, 
ensuring that a foreign service does not supplant a domestic one.115  
An analogous federal regulation might read as follows: “No state 
shall allow to be purchased or sold any health benefits plan that 
requires a beneficiary to travel to a foreign country to receive a 
particular health or medical procedure provided under that plan.”  
The rationale behind this implementation is threefold. 
First, regulation that requires insurers to offer alternatives to 
foreign travel leaves the paradigm of medical tourism as a relief 
valve in place.116  As described previously, the current paradigm is 
not materially deficient.117  It allows private self-pay individuals to 
travel overseas for medical care and, indeed, many Americans have 
 
 113  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1216.004 (West 2009). 
 114  Id. 
 115  It must be noted here that the effect of this regulation is principally on insurance 
incentivized patients.  As discussed supra in Part II.A,  it is unclear what effect, if any, 
this regulation will have on uninsured or underinsured patients.  
 116  See also McLean, supra note 12, at 597 (calling medical tourism, “[a] new 
paradigm for purchasing health care services”). 
 117  See supra Part III.A. 
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come to rely on foreign health services.118  Further, so long as 
insurers offer both foreign and domestic options to their patients, 
insurance incentivized individuals may take advantage of lower 
overseas rates. 
Second, patient beliefs about medical tourism may self-regulate 
and operate to limit overall patient volume abroad without 
additional regulatory measures.  As a cautionary aside, this possible 
self-regulation applies only to the incentivized insured and does not 
apply to uninsured or underinsured patients.119  For the uninsured 
or underinsured, the problem of price appears to be a non-issue.120  
Even if care is available both domestically and internationally, if 
those individuals cannot afford health insurance—or if they can 
afford the insurance, but the procedure is denied because it not 
medically necessary—they will receive the care overseas anyway, if 
at all.121  Insurance incentivized patient self-regulation may occur as 
a combination of two related components: (a) moral hazard, and 
(b) apprehension about overseas care. 
In this context, moral hazard describes the tendency of 
individuals to overconsume health care precisely because they are 
insured.122  Since their inception, managed care organizations have 
taken steps to reduce moral hazard, which increases the burden on 
the health delivery system.  Existing medical tourism plans have 
taken similar steps to decrease the possibility of moral hazard.  For 
example, insurers in California offering cross-border plans use low 
premium, high deductible plans to “minimize moral hazard.”123  
Lower premiums “encourage patients to travel abroad in the first 
instance” while high deductibles “could discourage moral 
 
 118  See supra note 82, at 286 (“The number of patients travelling from the developed 
world to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for treatments has ballooned in 
recent years, primarily driven by difficulties with accessing affordable care at home.”).  
 119  As discussed supra in Part II.A, because underinsured and uninsured individuals: 
(a) may heavily rely on medical tourism as their primary source of non-emergency care 
and (b) are unaffected by insurance restrictions, self-regulation is unlikely to affect 
these patients.  
 120  See Cohen, supra note 53, at 1480 (“The high cost of purchasing medical care 
out of pocket is an obvious reason for uninsured Americans to consider medical 
tourism, but it may play an important role for the underinsured as well.”). 
 121  After the passage of the ACA, there can be no denial of health treatment based 
on a pre-existing condition.  45 C.F.R. § 147.108 (2015) (stating that “a health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, may not 
impose any preexisting condition exclusion”).  Therefore, the single largest remaining 
factor determining whether a health procedure is covered involves a usage 
determination.  
 122  Cortez, supra note 14, at 101. 
 123  Id. 
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hazard.”124  However, this Note argues the opposite: that moral 
hazard, especially when coupled with pre-existing apprehension 
about overseas care, can limit travel for medical care.  Most insurance 
companies do not offer cross-border coverage and, therefore, most 
insurance incentivized patients are left to their own devices.125  
When given the choice, individuals who have already paid 
premiums to receive care may be financially inclined to undergo 
treatment domestically.  This is the precise definition of moral 
hazard. 126 
Additionally, factors other than price play a noteworthy role in 
influencing where patients receive care.127  Presumably, individuals 
remain apprehensive or uncomfortable with receiving care 
overseas.128  Whether this concern arises from the fear of sub-
standard quality of care or other concerns such as cultural, social, or 
linguistic barriers, it is clear that medical tourism remains (at this 
time) niche in part due to patient uncertainty.129  When this issue is 
considered in conjunction with the effect of moral hazard, it appears 
that insurance incentivized patients may, in fact, be self-regulating. 
It should be noted that self-regulation is only feasible in a band 
of values centered on an overseas care price point.  Patients may 
favor a domestic health provider over a foreign health provider even 
if the comparative cost is higher, but only to a point.  The extent of 
that tolerance is unclear.130 
The third rationale for the proposed regulation is that medical 
tourism exposes the U.S. health care market to competitively lower 
prices overseas.131  For example, in 2008, Hannaford Brothers, a 
grocery chain, offered its employees the option of traveling to 
 
 124  Cortez, supra note 14, at 102.  Professor Cortez writes that these schemes are to 
be met with some skepticism, stating that “[i]t is not clear whether we should be as 
optimistic as the World Bank that traditional insurance tools can effectively mitigate . . . 
moral hazard in overseas medical care, as these tools have arguably not worked well in 
the United States.”  
 125  Most cross-border care is still experimental.  See supra note 112.  
 126  See Cortez, supra note 14, at 101. 
 127  See Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs: 
Hearing before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 19 (2006) (statement of Arnold 
Milstein, M.D.).  
 128  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 53, at 1482 (suggesting that factors such as language, 
ethnic origin, cuisine, and religion effect patient comfort). 
 129  But this discomfort is eroding.  See, e.g., Powers supra note 6, at 79 (stating that 
the number of medical tourists visiting India alone tripled between 2002 and 2005). 
 130  The flexibility of individuals and willingness to pay around a certain medical 
tourist price point has not been discussed in previous literature and is an excellent topic 
for future research on the subject. 
 131  See Williams, supra note 7, at 625. 
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Singapore for surgery, where the insurance company would cover 
the bill.132  Although no employees availed themselves of the 
service, Hannaford Brothers was contacted by a U.S. insurer 
“offering to provide  . . . [Hannaford’s] employees with comparably 
priced operations in the U.S.”133  Additionally, a West Virginia bill 
proposed in 2006 gave state employees treatment options overseas 
at JCI-accredited hospitals.134  The bill proposed that employees 
availing themselves of the care would receive reimbursement for 
sick leave and a 20% rebate of the cost savings by the State.135  The 
legislators intended the bill to “save the state money . . . and 
encourage more competition between West Virginia medical 
facilities.”136 
In conclusion, regulations that give patients the option to 
receive care overseas but do not limit patients to that option or 
demand that it be exercised may be the most effective and least 
invasive regulations available.  Such regulations benefit from their 
relative simplicity, ease of implementation, and—other than 
possible right-to-travel issues—lack of material effect on 
experimentation into providing cross-border care solutions.137  
Further, self-regulation, preservation of medical tourism for at-risk 
populations who rely on the service, and the possibility of increased 
competition for domestic health providers all act to make this 
regulation extremely attractive. 
  
 
 132  Bruce Einhorn, Hannaford’s Medical-Tourism Experiment, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS 
(Nov. 9, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-11-09/hannafords-
medical-tourism-experimentbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-
advice.  
 133  Id.  
 134  See also Williams, supra note 7, at 655–56. 
 135  Kris Wise, Bill Would Cover Surgeries Outside U.S., CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 
3, 2006, at 7A. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Implementation of this type of regulation would be simple because it only 
affects providers who offer cross-border options.  Additionally, the regulation only 
requires the review of managed care contracts—something that both state and federal 
insurance regulating bodies already do.  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 438.6 (2015) (stating that 
for federal medical assistance programs, “[t]he CMS Regional Office must review and 
approve all [managed care contracts]”); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the 
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 626 (1999) (stating that in all places where 
federal regulation is absent, states are free to impose their own regulations, particularly 
with regard to insurance). 
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C. Broad Brushstrokes and the Future of Medical Tourism 
Regulation 
This Note promotes a two-stage regulation mechanism.  The 
first stage involves regulation that gives consumers a choice between 
domestic or foreign care.138  This sort of passive de minimis 
regulation is simple to administer and can be quickly implemented.  
In contrast, the second stage of regulation is more extensive and 
complex and, because it is active, it should only come into effect as 
a result of some triggering condition.  The triggering condition 
attempts to determine the point at which health care services being 
offered to medical tourists would otherwise become available to the 
destination country’s poor.  The reason for using this particular 
condition, which ostensibly focuses more on the demand for health 
services in the destination country rather than the state of the U.S. 
health care economy, is twofold. 
First, medical tourism facilities currently have no proven 
negative effect on destination countries.139  Although their positive 
effect is also questionable at this point, the only definitive 
conclusion is that medical tourism facilities have an unknown effect 
on destination countries.140  This is because medical tourism 
facilities cater to a price point and to a service that indigenous 
patients cannot afford.141  Although current theorists fear a two-
tiered health delivery system will be established in destination 
countries, it is unlikely that such a division exists at this time.142  It 
is even possible that a system promoting this type of stratification 
will never exist.  The phenomenon of medical tourism may fade into 
irrelevance as the U.S. health economy undergoes major overhauls 
following the implementation of the ACA.143  Alternatively, 
 
 138  See discussion supra Part III.B, especially notes 113–15. 
 139  See supra note 83. 
 140  Id. at 877–78. 
 141  See Cohen, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that many indigenous patients are 
unlikely to be able to afford boutique treatments provided to medical tourists anyway).  
 142  Churnrurtai Kanchanachitra, et al., Medical Tourism in Southeast Asia: 
Opportunites and Challenges, in RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN MEDICAL TOURISM: 
UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR HEALTH SERVICES 56, 76–79 (Jill R. Hodges, 
Leigh Turner & Ann Marie Kimball, eds., 2012).   
 143  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT—CBO’S FEBRUARY 2014 BASELINE (2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2014-02-ACAtables.pdf (suggesting that the 
ACA will reduce the total number of uninsured by approximately 25 million).  See also 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2613 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
18091(2)(C) and (1) (2006 ed., Supp. IV)) (stating that the central aim of the ACA is 
to reduce the total number of uninsured Americans). 
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continued economic development in destination countries may 
create robust health systems to adequately cater to indigenous 
populations and medical tourists.144 
At this point, it is difficult to suggest that medical tourism 
creates a two-tiered system of health delivery since poor individuals 
would be unable to access health care regardless of the existence of 
medical tourism facilities.145  For example, it is currently unlikely 
that medical tourism by U.S. patients in New Delhi would diminish 
access to those services utilized by poor Indian patients.146  
Therefore, the triggering condition of prospective regulation 
correctly focuses on the moment when health tourism actually 
begins to affect the viability of destination country health services. 
Second, the Joint Commission International (“JCI”) is currently 
collecting data that informs this triggering condition.147  As part of 
its certification process, JCI collects information on patient clinical 
records.148  The JCI standard states that a hospital must “initiate[] 
and maintain[] a standardized clinical record for every patient 
assessed or treated and determine[] the record’s content, format, and 
location of entries.”149  Further, the “clinical record [must] contain[] 
sufficient information to identify the patient . . . [and] to justify the 
treatment.”150  Although the purpose of this Note is not to explain 
the information collection methods of the JCI, it is possible that 
information regarding hospital capacity, the nationality of treated 
patients, and the type of treatment they are receiving is already 
available through JCI records.151  Ideally, this data might be used to 
extrapolate an estimate or basis for indigenous demand for health 
 
 144  See Kanchanachitra et al., supra note 142, at 76–79.  (“[T]here are little definitive 
data on the extent to which the benefits of medical tourism, which at least initially 
accrue to private hospitals, eventually extend to the public sector.”).  While tax 
incentives and other government efforts to promote medical tourism theoretically 
increase access of care to poorer patients, there is no consensus as to the actual effect.  
Id.  The matter remains a topic of fierce debate.  
 145  See Cohen, supra note 13, at 9 (“[M]edical tourism by American patients . . . 
would not necessarily diminish access for poor Indian patients (which would remain 
steady at virtually none).”). 
 146  There is some danger that medical tourism limits access to indigenous middle-
class and wealthy persons.  See Cohen, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
 147  See Williams, supra note 7, at 680. 
 148  JOINT COMM’N INT’L, JOINT COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS 
FOR HOSPITALS 66 (5th ed., 2014), available at http://www.jointcommission 
international.org/assets/3/7/Hospital-5E-Standards-Only-Mar2014.pdf. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. (emphasis added). 
 151  See Williams, supra note 7, at 640–42, 680. 
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services.152  Thus, the information necessary to create an effective 
regulatory triggering mechanism, and the regulatory system itself, 
might be available now in the data JCI currently collects.153 
The second stage regulatory mechanism operates under the 
following assumptions.  First, at the time of this writing, medical 
tourism has been accepted as a relief valve for source health systems.  
Insurers and patients have already reaped the benefits of medical 
tourism and will be accustomed to its presence.154  Therefore, 
complete removal of a medical tourism option is impracticable.  
Second, medical tourism as the sole option for patients will have 
been curbed or eliminated due to the effect of the stage one 
regulation.155  This regulation would have hopefully allowed 
domestic markets to reclaim some volume of patients requiring 
eventually medically necessary services.  Third, at the time phase two 
regulation is necessary, something must be done to limit the growth 
of medical tourism such that output bound patient volume remains 
at a level that will not upset the balance of the global health care 
framework.  Two possible plans of action that adhere to the 
constraints above may prevent unsustainable medical tourism 
growth. 
The first plan of action involves rationing medical tourism 
services.  Rationing is often seen as a “dirty word” in the health care 
context.156  However, rationing recognizes that medical services are 
limited by financial constraints.157  Rationing care, especially in the 
private health insurance market, may be more tenable in the context 
of medical tourism because doing so constitutes rationing a 
supplemental health resource rather than a primary health resource.  
While the actual machinery of rationing care is beyond the ambit of 
this discussion, this Note envisions two types of rationing 
paradigms: rationing based on medical procedure and rationing 
based on volume. 158 
 
 152  For example, by looking at nationality of the patient and type of treatment 
received. 
 153  There is an outstanding issue with privacy of patient data.  However, this issue 
is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 154  This is assuming that the phenomenon has room to expand, which evidence, at 
least on an anecdotal level, seems to support.  See Cortez, supra note 14, at 108. 
 155  See supra Part III.B. 
 156  Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-t.html (“In the current 
U.S. debate over health care reform, rationing has become a ‘dirty word.’”). 
 157  Id.  
 158  For more information on various rationing paradigms, see Leslie P. 
Scheunemann & Douglas B. White, The Ethics and Reality of Rationing in Medicine, 140 
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In the rationing based on medical procedure framework, 
private insurers may allow a medical tourism option only for 
medically necessary care.  This method of rationing has already been 
practiced to some extent in Europe.  Currently, Medicare and 
Medicaid already provide guidelines on what constitutes medically 
necessary care.159  It would not be a substantial deviation to apply 
those guidelines to rationing medical care.  The current CMS 
guidelines on medical necessity for orthopedic implants could be 
used to determine eligibility for medical tourism to receive such an 
implant.160  This sort of rationing does eliminate eventually 
medically necessary care, but it is needed to prevent volume shock. 
In the rationing based on volume framework, rationing 
medical care would be centered on the number of people who are 
permitted to obtain a certain procedure.  While rationing based on 
medical procedure is theoretically limitless, rationing based on 
volume sets a numerical cap on the number of individuals who can 
actually obtain certain treatment.  Rationing based on volume is 
especially controversial because it poses the same question that 
medical tourism is intended to solve: how can individuals obtain 
medically necessary care if they do not meet the quota?  
Additionally, adopting rationing ex post—after medical tourism is 
allowed to flourish—is atavistic.  It amounts to a regression from 
being able to offer certain medical services via exploitation of the 
global health market to being unable to offer such services.  
However, the complexity of this matter is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
Both types of rationing involve difficult value based 
determinations that must weigh cost versus quality of life.  For 
example, a decision to forgo a certain medical procedure due to its 
low incident rate could doom patients with rare diseases when 
rationing is based strictly on what type of medical procedures are 
provided.161  Rationing based on volume presents an equally 
 
CHEST J. 1625, 1626–27 (2011). 
 159  See HOUGLUM, supra note 66. 
 160  Id. 
 161  See Singer, supra note 156.  The article describes Britain’s National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence’s (NICE) recommendation against the use of Pfizer’s 
drug Sutent for patients with advanced kidney cancer.  The cost for the drug exceeded 
the £30,000 (or $49,000) cost of extending life for one year.  Six months later, NICE 
reversed its decision after Pfizer agreed to administer the first round of treatment free 
for the National Health Service, making the treatment more cost effective.  See Henry 
Scowcroft, NICE Recommends Sutent (sunitinib) for Advanced Kidney Cancer, CANCER 
RESEARCH UK (Feb. 4, 2009), http://scienceblog.cancerresearchuk. 
org/2009/02/04/nice-recommends-sutent-sunitinib-for-advanced-kidney-cancer/. 
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uncomfortable situation where a lottery system is used to determine 
priority.162  While these ethical questions remain unanswered, they 
are important considerations in deciding what path the United 
States should take if stage two regulation becomes necessary. 
The second plan of action to prevent unsustainable medical 
tourism growth should use rationing based on medical procedure.  
In other words, private insurers may allow a medical tourism option 
only for medically necessary care.  As stated above, the usage of the 
term medically necessary should continue to follow Medicare and 
Medicaid guidelines.  One implementation of this plan involves 
imposing taxes on the use of medical tourism.163  Imposing a tax on 
medical tourism must be done according to some sort of procedure 
triage—operations that are medically necessary should incur the 
least amount of tax, with eventually medically necessary procedures 
taxed at a middle tier, and cosmetic care taxed most heavily.  
Imposing different tax levels on specific types of medical tourism 
will limit undesirable behavior while still allowing the procedures 
to be undertaken where medically necessary.164 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no substitute for widespread national health care 
reform.  Medical tourism acts in a temporary capacity as a relief valve 
for costly health care in the U.S.165  However, medical tourism is not 
intended to be the panacea.  Hopefully, by phasing in regulation, 
medical tourism will be allowed to relieve financial pressure on 
patients in the United States as long as it is possible.  This has the 
added benefit of exposing the American health care system to 
foreign pressure to aid in overall cost reduction.  Despite these 
perceived benefits, all the proposed regulatory devices are 
predicated on the need for more data.  Principally, the key data 
point missing for these regulations and their effective 
implementation is information on the number of Americans who 
 
 162  See Scheunemann & White, supra note 158, at 1628. 
 163  For a more detailed discussion of how tax law may be used to influence medical 
tourism, see I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the 
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1513–16 (2010). 
 164  Cigarette taxes are a good example of using tax policy to regulate certain 
undesirable behavior.  For example, a Thai study performed in 2009 showed that 
increasing taxes for cigarettes reduced smoking at least 48%.  See Mondha 
Kengganpanich, Lakkhana Termsirikulchai & Sarunya Benjakul, The Impact of Cigarette 
Tax Increase on Smoking Behavior of Daily Smokers, 92 J. MED. ASSOC. THAI. S46, S48 
(Supp. 7) (2009). 
 165  See supra notes 36–40. 
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will travel abroad and for what treatment or procedure.  Finally, 
empirical data on the effect of medical tourism in destination 
countries, including patient nationality and medical procedure, 
would be invaluable in ensuring a better analysis of the global 
landscape of medical tourism. 
There are numerous uncertainties about medical tourism that 
make it difficult to predict what its likely effects will be.  It is possible 
that these anticipated issues will never materialize.  However, that 
does not alleviate the need to err on the side of caution in order to 
best prevent both domestic and international problems from 
arising.  At this point, the next step should be to implement a 
regulatory scheme that allows de minimis control of patient volume 
and the continuation of research regarding what an elaborate and 
complete regulatory solution should aim to achieve. 
 
